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It now seems highly likely that transmission of wild poliovirus
will be interrupted throughout the world towards the end of
2002, and the disease of poliomyelitis will join smallpox as
another that mankind has abolished by the use of a vaccine. At
present, circulation in any community is confined to west and
central Africa, particularly in Nigeria and the Horn of Africa,
and to the Indian subcontinent. However, these areas also
include countries of political instability and conflict, which
have made surveillance and vaccine administration difficult.
Nevertheless, the interruption of the circulating wild virus
will not totally remove the possibility of the disease recurring.
Substantial numbers of poliovirus-containing specimens and
other positive materials are still present in the deep freezes in
laboratories of many kinds all over the world, and ensuring that
these viruses do not escape will remain a challenge as long as any
viable poliovirus remains.
Against this background, the World Health Organization
Regional Office for Europe convened a Sub-Regional Meeting
of National Co-ordinators for Laboratory Containment of Wild
Polioviruses in Prague on 13–15 December 2000 to discuss the
problems posed by these poliovirus-containing materials
remaining within its region after 2002, and to hear how plans
to evaluate and manage them in individual countries are
progressing.
Anticipating the end of wild poliovirus circulation, the
World Health Organization produced a ‘WHO Global Action
Plan for Laboratory Containment of Wild Polioviruses’ [1] in
1999. This invited each country to establish a national inventory
of poliovirus-containing materials, to encourage the destruc-
tion of stocks of such materials if they were no longer required
and to arrange that those which are retained will be handled
only at appropriate BioSafety (Handling) Levels (BSLs) in
future. Representatives of 30 countries in Europe met with
staff of WHO’s European Regional Office from Copenhagen,
Temporary Advisers and staff Members from the WHO Polio
Eradication Programme Headquarters in Geneva for 2 days to
exchange information on how far they had progressed towards
implementing the recommendations made in the Plan.
Most countries had appointed a National Co-ordinator
supported by a Containment Committee, and many had begun
to send out questionnaires to laboratories to assemble an
inventory of those with stocks of materials, either known to
contain wild poliovirus or which might. This applies to material
kept in freezers for more than 1 month, but not to that kept at
room temperature in which the virus would not survive. There
was also a practical need to get heads of laboratories to assess the
contents of their freezers comprehensively rather than perfunc-
torily. This would mean that each laboratory Head would be
required to take personal responsibility for the response by
insisting on signatures, not just initials, at all levels of assessment,
and signing the final version him/herself.
However, putting together a comprehensive list of all the
relevant laboratories had proved, in many situations, to be more
difficult than expected. Listing diagnostic virology laboratories
was usually straightforward, but the list would also have to
include other virology and microbiology laboratories in Uni-
versities and research Institutes, those under the aegis of a
surprisingly long list of Government ministries, as well as a
variable number of private laboratories and manufacturers of
vaccines and disinfectants (who may test their products using
stock wild polioviruses).
Immigrants and refugees, some of whom came from pre-
sently endemic areas (or who travelled to and from them), and
who tended to slip outside regular medical services, also pre-
sented continuing problems over where specimens taken from
them were examined and kept. Equally importantly, the list
must include a wide variety of nonmicrobiologic laboratories,
such as those studying aspects of nutrition both in their own
countries and in, for example, developing countries. These
laboratories may have made or retained survey collections of
feces made in geographical areas where polio was endemic at the
time, but without the present ‘owners’ necessarily being aware
that these specimens will often contain infectious agents,
including poliovirus. Hence, considerable lateral thinking
would be needed to assemble an adequately comprehensive
list of laboratories where viable poliovirus may remain as a
potential hazard for the future.
When the list for each country is complete, a more detailed
inventory of the actual contents of the freezers would have to be
made. The collective expectation at the meeting was that this
detailed scrutiny would turn up a considerable number of (often
poorly labeled or anonymous) ampoules and bottles whose
existence had long been forgotten, and many of those who
had put them there would have moved, retired or even died.
Taking such detritus out of deep-freezes would be valuable in
itself. In this chase-the-virus exercise, the smaller European
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countries, with fewer laboratories to identify, have often made
more progress with this inventory than the larger ones.
As soon as natural polio transmission has ceased, the require-
ments for adequate handling containment will rise. BSL 2/
p(olio) should be the current norm for working with any kind
of wild poliovirus and all potentially infectious material. From
about 2003, the point defined as 1 year after the last wild strain
has been isolated, BSL-3 biosafety standards must be applied to
the handling of wild poliovirus and all potentially infectious
material. After poliomyelitis is declared eradicated, projected to
be in 2005, and as polio immunization is discontinued from,
probably, 2010 (though it may be earlier in some countries), all
work with wild poliovirus will have to be carried out at BSL 4,
but such expensive and elaborate facilities will be available only
in a very small number of places. At the same time, work with
materials containingonly livevaccine (OPV) strainswill thenhave
to be upgraded to BSL 3/p, because OPVescaping and passaging
through a nonimmune population may revert to full virulence.
Poliovirus, whether as isolates, known positive specimens,
neurologic or other pathologic specimens or as potentially
infectious (but untested) feces, throat swabs or blood samples,
will not escape from a freezer unaided. The virus-containing
material will have to be taken out and used for some purpose
involving amplification or giving it greater kinetic energy (e.g.
by homogenization or being dropped) before it can reach and
infect susceptibles. High titer virus (i.e. where the original
amount of virus has been increased by culture, or by nucleic acid
amplification techniques (such as reverse transcription PCR)),
can present a hazard as it is, but unamplified samples pose a
much smaller risk. Nonetheless, such materials will remain as
potential time bombs if they are kept into an era in which there
are (rapidly) declining levels of immunity in the population.
One of the most efficient magnifiers of virus is a nonimmune
individual of any age, and he/she will not necessarily show
clinical signs or symptoms of disease despite being well able to
disseminate high titer virus. If the need for containment is not
taken seriously, it is not difficult to imagine a scenario in the
future in which an unimmunized susceptible worker takes a
stool specimen out of a freezer to assay fat levels, homogenizes it
to make it uniform in consistency, infects himself and his
colleagues and/or family, and accidentally initiates a new epi-
demic which would be very difficult to arrest. Other similar
scenarios can be assembled without difficulty. The issue here is
not the retention of specimens or virus, but ensuring that app-
ropriate levels of validated Biosafety Handling are always used.
Aware of these possibilities, those at the meeting agreed that
each national list of laboratories must be fully comprehensive
and that there should be positive encouragement to discard any
nonessential virus-containing materials, and to do so safely.
What is classified as essential will have to be decided within each
country, and WHO cannot compel the staff of any laboratory to
dispose of material which has been collected or kept for good
scientific reasons, and which they deem to be important. But it
can insist that it is stored and handled only at the right BSL, and
laboratories will find that setting up and using the necessary
higher containment facilities de novo will incur significant and
unavoidable costs. Moreover, few scientists would wish to court
the widespread and intense international publicity that would
focus on anyone who had the misfortune to reintroduce polio
into the world, all the more so if it was shown to be due to
sloppy technique or inadequate facilities. The combination of
these two negative aspects may persuade some workers that
retaining their stocks of material, of whatever kind, is simply not
worth the risk.
Though widespread polio immunization will be discontin-
ued around 2010, it is likely that pressure to maintain high levels
of uptake will decline after 2005. Oral (live) polio vaccine
(OPV) is associated with a low, but measurable, rate of com-
plicating paralytic disease – a risk that can be justified in the face
of circulating wild virus. As the latter disappears, both the risk
and the cost of using OPV become increasingly unacceptable.
Because the virus in the vaccine may revert to higher virulence
after a single passage through man, some countries (of which
Belgium is the latest) are already changing to inactivated polio
vaccine (IPV) as an interim measure. IPV has for a long time
been the vaccine of choice in the Netherlands and Scandinavia
but it, too, is expensive and all countries will want to discon-
tinue routine immunization with either vaccine as soon as there
is agreement that it is safe to do so.
There is therefore powerful pressure to reduce the risk of wild
virus escaping again, and the various national plans presented at
the Prague meeting all had this as their ultimate aim. Once the
laboratory inventories and catalogues are complete, and
improved handling facilities are in place, preferably by March
2002 at the latest, each country will start to institute the re-
quired Biosafety Handling levels for these materials. Though
some countries are further advanced than others at the moment,
this should not be an unattainable goal. Further meetings are
planned soon to include those countries not represented in
Prague, and to continue to monitor progress throughout Europe.
Polio as a naturally occurring infectious agent is about to
disappear. Making sure it never reappears will still require a great
deal of work, and some clear thinking in justifying what should
be retained in deep freezes in a wide variety of laboratories. It
would be a monumental tragedy if so much hard work by so
many people in every continent was ruined by a bit of care-
lessness or ignorance by one person. We (everyone involved)
must work together to eliminate that possibility.
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